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Abstract 
ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and 
use non-biological operations that cannot learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate 
trend of straw man "debates" in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, neural 
models of cognition can handle both symbols and sub-symbolic representations, and meets the 
Newell criteria at least as well as these models. 
COMMENTARY 
The authors' nomenclature "classical connectionist models" falsely suggests that such models 
satisfy Newell criteria better than other neural models of cognition. The authors then dichotomize 
ACT with "classical" connectionism based on its "failure to acknowledge a symbolic level to 
thought. In contrast, ACT-R includes both symbolic and subsymbolic components" (pp. 1-2). 
Actually, neural models of cognition such as ART include both types of representation, and 
clarify how they are learned. Moreover, ART was introduced before the "classical" models 
(Grossberg, 1976, 1978a, 1980) and naturally satisfies key Newell criteria. In fact, Figures 2 and 
3 of ACT are reminiscent of ART circuits (e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 
1999b). But ART goes further by proposing how laminar neocmtical circuits integrate bottom-
up, horizontal, and top-down interactions for intelligent computation (Grossberg, 1999a; Raizada 
and Grossberg, 2003). 
Critiques of "classical" connectionist models, below called CM (Carnegie Mellon) 
connectionism, show that many such models cannot exist in the brain (e.g., Grossberg, 1988; 
Grossberg et a!., 1997; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996). Below ART is claimed to satisfy many 
Newell criteria better, with the obvious caveat that no model is yet a complete neural theory of 
cognition. 
Flexible behavior: ART models are self-organizing neural production systems capable of fast, 
stable, real-time learning about arbitrarily large, unexpectedly changing environments (Carpenter 
and Grossberg, 1991). These properties suit ART for large-scale technological applications, 
ranging from control of mobile robots, face recognition, remote sensing, medical diagnosis, and 
electrocardiogram analysis to tool failure monitoring, chemical analysis, circuit design, 
protein/DNA analysis, musical analysis, and seismic, sonar, and radar recognition, in both 
software and VLSI microchips (e.g., Carpenter et a!., 1999; Carpenter and Milenova, 2000; 
Granger eta!., 2001). The criticism ofCM connectionism "that complex, sequentially organized, 
hierarchical behavior" cannot be modeled also does not apply to ART (e.g., Brad ski et a!., 1994; 
Cohen and Grossberg, 1978a, 1986; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1989; Grossberg and Myers, 
2000; also see Dynamic Behavior below). 
Real-time pe1jormance: ART models are manifestly real-time in design, unlike CM connectionist 
models. 
Adaptive behavior: ART provides a rigorous solution of the stability-plasticity dilemma, which 
was my term for catastrophic forgetting before that phrase was coined. "Limitations like short-
term memory" (p. 25) can be derived fi·om the LTM Invariance Principle, which proposes how 
working memories are designed to enable their stored event sequences to be stably chunked and 
remembered (Bradski et a!., 1994; Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b ). 
Vast Knowledge Base: ART can directly access the globally best-matching information in its 
mem01y no matter how much it has learned. It includes additional criteria of value and temporal 
relevance through its embedding in START models that include Cognitive-Emotional and 
Adaptive Timing circuits in addition to cognitive ART circuits (Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 
1996). 
Dynamic Behavior: "Dealing with dynamic behavior requires a theory of perception and action as 
well as a the01y of cognition" (p. 6). LAMINART models propose how ART principles are 
incorporated into perceptual neocortical circuits and how high-level cognitive constraints can 
modulate lower perceptual representations through top-down matching and attention (Grossberg, 
1999a; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003). ART deals with novelty through complementmy 
interactions between attentional and orienting systems (Grossberg, 1999b, 2000b), the former 
including cortico-cOJiical and the latter hippocampal circuits. Action circuits also obey laws that 
are complementmy to those used in perception and cognition (Grossberg, 2000b), notably YAM 
(Vector Associative Map) laws. V AM-based models have simulated identified brain cells and 
circuits and the actions that they control (e.g., Brown et a!., 1999; Bullock eta!., 1998; Contreras-
Vidal et a!., 1997; Fiala et a!., 1996; Gancarz and Grossberg, 1999; Grossberg et a!., 1997), 
including models of motor skill learning and perf01mance (Bullock, Grossberg, and Guenther, 
1993; Bullock, Grossberg, and Mannes, 1993; Grossberg and Paine, 2000). 
Knowledge Integration: ART reconciles distributed and syn1bolic representations using its 
concept of resonance. Individual features are meaningless, just like pixels in a picture are 
meaningless. A learned category, or symbol, is sensitive to the global patterning of features, but 
cannot represent the "contents" of the experience, including their conscious qualia, due to the 
very fact that a categ01y is a compressed, or symbolic, representation. Resonance between these 
two types of information converts the pattern of attended features into a coherent context-
sensitive state that is linked to its symbol through feedback. This coherent state, which binds 
distributed features and symbolic categories, can enter consciousness. ART predicts that all 
conscious states are resonant states. In particular, resonance binds spatially distributed features 
into a synchronous equilibrium or oscillation. Such synchronous states attracted interest after 
being reported in neurophysiological experiments. They were predicted in the 1970's when ART 
was introduced (see Grossberg, 1999b). Recent neurophysiological experiments have supported 
other ART predictions (Engel eta!., 2001; Pollen, 1999; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003). Fuzzy 
ART learns explicitly decodable Fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Carpenter et a!., 1992). Thus ART 
accommodates symbols and rules, as well as sub-symbolic distributed computations. 
Natural Language: ART has not yet modeled language. Rather, it is filling a gap that ACT-R has 
left open: "ACT-R lacks any theory of ... speech perception or speech production" (p. 22). ART is 
clarifying the perceptual units of speech perception, word recognition, working mem01y, and 
sequential planning chunks on which the brain builds language (e.g., Boardman et a!., 1999; 
Bradski eta!., 1994; Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b, 1999b; Grossberg eta!., 1997; Grossberg and 
Myers, 2000; Grossberg and Stone, 1986a, 1986b). Such studies suggest that a radical rethinking 
of psychological space and time is needed to understand language, and to accommodate such 
radical claims as: Conscious speech is a resonant wave. ACT -R also does not have 
'mechanisms ... [of] perceptual recognition, mental imagery, emotion, and motivation" (p. 22). 
These are all areas where ART has detailed models (e.g., Grossberg, 2000a, 2000c). Speech 
production uses complementmy V AM-like mechanisms (Callan et al., 2000; Guenther, 1995). 
After perceptual units in vision became sufficiently clear, rapid progress ensued at all levels of 
vision (http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg). This should also happen for language. 
Development: ART predicted since 1976 that processes of cortical development in the infant are 
on a continuum with processes of lem·ning in the adult, a prediction increasing supported recently 
(e.g., Kandel and O'Dell, 1992). 
Evolution: "Cognitive plasticity ... What enables this plasticity in the architecture?" (p. 29). ART 
clarifies how the ability to learn quickly and stably throughout life implies cognitive properties 
like intention, attention, hypothesis testing, and resonance. Although Bayesian properties emerge 
from ART circuits, ART deals with novel experiences where no priors are defined. 
Brain: CM connectionism is said to be Best, although its main algorithms are biologically 
unrealizable. ART and YAM are realized in verified brain circuits. 
It might be prudent to include more ART in ACT. I also recommend eliminating straw man 
"debates" that do not reflect the true state of knowledge in cognitive science. 
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